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Classification theories in cognitive science concepts according to the identity condition

Guido Vallejos
Center for Cognitive Studies

Department of Philosophy Faculty of Philosophy and Humanities
Universidad de Chile

I will explain how they could be classified theories of concepts if we assume that a condition of identity among these is that they are mental representations, and how that could be classified if we assume that they are not.

Under the first assumption, and following the theories currently on offer, there are two alternatives that can be chosen: either the concepts are mostly structured representations, or complex, or are mostly simple, or atomic. Mode but not limited to putting the two options at first sight seems strange, but understandable given the nature of the theories of concepts that seek to rely on some kind of experimental evidence in science cognitive (see Chapter I).

In the first option, since one purpose of these empirical approaches to explain the cognitive tasks appealing to mental processes in which the concepts have a central role, given that cognitive processes can generally be characterized as inferential processes, inferences that are made on, or under the concepts, require that these have a degree of structure or complexity to justify the inferential transitions are made between concepts. Thus, although it is assumed that the concepts as complex representations must be simple constituents, is explanatorily irrelevant for psychology and designed to establish what the ultimate constituents of the concepts. Rather, his work focuses on establishing how a concept is related to traits associated with (other) in order to facilitate inferences. This being the case, asserting that the concepts are mostly structured or complex is a way of saying that what is explanatorily relevant is the complexity of a concept, for the purposes of psychological theories in question. However, this purpose could lead to an explanatory statement on the ontological character natutaleza of concepts: concepts are complex mental representations or structured. But given the prominence of the purposes of explanation, the statement is moderated: the concepts are mostly complex representations. Although this character restrained, the theories in question as the only alternative left individuation of a concept by its relations with other concepts-ie, its constituent traits, "with which it interacts with different degrees of strength and with different degrees of scope .

Under this heading may be mentioned the following theories:

1. classical theory of definitions. A concept is a complex representation that individual under the necessary relationship with each of its constituents, and sufficiently related to the conjunction of their constituent features.
2. neoclassical theory. A concept is a complex representation that is individualized for the necessary relationship it has with its constituents. In this case, excludes the sufficiency condition, it is not possible to list exhaustively the combination of conceptual constituents or features.
3. prototype theory. A concept is a complex representation to individuals for their statistical associations with traits common constituents. If the theory of prototypes is conceived in terms of copies, then a concept is a complex representation to individuals for their similarity relationships statistically codable, with the representation of its copies. It is worth remembering, however, the argument of Murphy, 2002, under which the theory presupposes copies of prototypes and, therefore, is reduced or can be explained by the latter.
4. The theory-theory. A concept is a complex representation that individual because of his connections with concepts belonging to adjacent theories, which in turn can be part of a theory of the world total of an individual at one point in their cognitive development. The fact that it appeals to adjacent theories does not mean they have to also appeal to the theory of the world total in which adjacent theories are included. A radical theory subscribe to the latter theory approach (as can be attributed to Gopnik), although others would not need moderating take this radical position (such as Keil, and perhaps Murphy) This is not means that the characteristics of the mode of individuation that underlies their proposals, can not be forced to assume.

A second option is, if it is accepted that concepts are representations, is to argue that the concepts are mostly simple or atomic. In this case it is assumed that to explain the mental processes that allow us to intelligent behavior, it is not necessary to assume as a basic postulate that inferences are constitutive of cognitive processes. There is a most basic instance, which is to postulate that thought is compositional. This requires just accept that there is a finite set of simple lexical items (concepts) and a finite set of rules that compose into more complex structures of these constituents. In turn, the compositionality explains the productive and systematic nature of thought. The ability to make inferences not lie in the complexity or the structured nature of theories characterized above as essential to the concepts, and his explanation is consistent with the possibility of unstructured concepts. The theoretical framework outlined above, could explain the psychological fact that no structured concepts, but only on the basis of individuation of its constituents, without thereby losing its role concepts in the explanation of cognition.
The only theory proposed on this last option is Fodor's Informational Atomism. The characterization that we have made this position above merely states that the thesis according to which the concepts are complex representations is neither explained nor metaphysically necessary. According to the above, the informational atomism does not specify how to formulate the conditions to single out the concepts as simple entities. In this sense we can only consider the possibility the thesis that concepts are simple or atomic representations.

For the second group of theories, concepts are essentially representations. This thesis requires a clarification. It is not disputed that the concepts can be represented, but rather what it denies is that they can identify with representations. In an ontological sense, the identification establishes a metaphysical dependence with a degree of force that would be impossible to conceive concepts that are not mental representations. In contrast, what theories down the second group is a branch of the concepts of a field of different properties of the representational field.

The extreme points of the offer are basically twofold. One of the ends suggests that metaphysical concepts are extra-mental entities, and mental representations of these concepts can be depends on subjects that are able to grasp the concepts of the Third Field. Frege and neofregeano as Peacocke are inclined to this option. For Frege the concepts are senses or thoughts on a metaphysical level extramental and under its individuation as the senses, through its intensional definition [ [1] ] that the concepts have conditions reference and truth. For Frege, anything that has to do with the mind and mental processes must be involved in the individuation of concepts. Peacocke, however, have access to this third area as a central problem for the individuation of concepts. Such access is not only possible by our ability to make judgments that demonstrate our grasp of the concept, but by an agent, more specifically a thinking-which is propositional attitudes that demonstrate proper use of the concept within these states of mind. This allows Peacocke individuate concepts by their terms of possession and indirect access to the individuation of concepts in the Third Field. Thus, all that is relevant to the individuation of concepts is present in the formulation of those conditions hold. The conditions of ownership and made must be explained in terms subdoxastic by psychology. It is in this area that could explain the realization of the conditions of possession in representational terms that meet the requirements of the Representational Theory of Mind, Fodor proposed under the Informational Atomism. But, if we assume that Peacocke's theory is true, the AI \u200b\u200bwould not apply to single out a concept but, rather, only explain how to perform the condition possession of a concept.

neofregeanas Among the theories, there is some (Cussins) to formulate terms of possession and require explanation by the same psychology is not yet sufficient to determine how the concepts , understood in the manner of Frege and Peacocke, significantly used in daily life by the actors. Individuation through possession conditions calls for a thoughtful ideal, whose knowledge of the concept is manifested by the fact that it has propositional attitudes containing it. In turn, the psychological explanation is the specification states and mechanisms that perform this condition, without using the vocabulary doxastic possession conditions. For a complete definition of the concepts and meanings, is required to specify not only the conditions for its realization, but the conditions governing its application in various circumstances. The senses can determine the reference in the abstract, but do not contain adequate specifications to determine a number of circumstances. Such conditions and specifications do not depend on rules but would be based on usage. The exclusion rules for specific applications only leaves as the last instance determination to experience, not understood by traditional empiricist way, but in terms of a subjectivity attached to environmental factors, through interactions established between body and environment. The information that emerges from this interaction is a form of nonconceptual content, which would eventually adapted to the metaphysical concepts such as Frege neofregeana.

At the other end of the theories that deny that concepts are essentially representations, we find the approach that the concepts are metaphysically explanatory and dependent on experience or experiential patterns. In this case, the term 'Experience' not to be understood in the manner of traditional empiricists, with varying degrees of emphasis defend depending on the experience of mental factors. The notion of experience in extreme theory which we refer, it depends on what we ordinarily think of as mental factors and environmental body, but, in the opinion of those who hold this view, are indistinguishable as such in the same flow experience. For those who advocate this perspective, metaphorical concepts are mere projections of the experience and understood, more literally, the concepts are identified with metaphors experientially based, not mental representations belong to a similar abstract to the symbolic domain.

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[1] In philosophy there is a difference between what is meant by the expression 'intentional -to-c ', which in general terms, is referred to the field of mental states, and' intentional-with-s', referring to the significance. A comprehensive treatment and also close to the intuition can be found at Searle, 1981.

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basis for an ontology of concepts

Guido Vallejos

Center for Cognitive Studies Department

Philosophy Faculty of Philosophy and Humanities

Universidad de Chile

An ontology of concepts is intended to make the conditions of individuation of the constitutive properties of the same. Constitutive properties means those that make a concept is what it is and nothing else. There are certain properties that intuitively ascribe to concepts of which those listed below seem to have a special relevance. First are mental entities of some kind, that have a crucial role in our thought processes, and second, they are mental things that make us think about the world and other things that are not concepts, and thirdly, that the fact concepts that have an impact on the role that concepts play in our cognitive processes and on the property that they have to be about something other than themselves. From these properties that intuitively ascribe these entities, the ontology should formulate the conditions which would result in satisfaction of such individuation properties. However, most fundamentally, it seems, is not formulated in precise terms those conditions, but to provide arguments that would found the possibility of developing these conditions. The arguments should show that these properties are actually constitutive of concepts, that meeting these conditions would result in clear individuation of those properties and that no other properties that could be regarded as constituting. An additional requirement is that an ontology of this type allows you to specify, at least in principle, the substantive assumptions of any theory supported by experimental evidence in cognitive science. This is not a requirement intrinsic to the ontology, but rather by the characteristics that currently the division of labor within cognitive science.

Consistent with the finding in the previous paragraph, we can say that the ontology of concepts is intended to make three types of conditions.

1. individuation conditions of a concept or, to avoid further confusion, the terms of identity. These should not only allow us to distinguish the concepts of other kinds of things in the world, but also distinguish two concepts are coreferential, ie, they express the same content-as in the case of water and H2O. concept. On the other hand, bases would be established based on what the more general domain ontology which includes concepts, the most common options are that concepts are entities that belong to the realm of mental and concepts belong to an extra domain -mental. Assuming that belong to the realm of the mind must be clear what is the subdomain of the mind which are metaphysically dependent. Finally, the ontology must account for the conditions that allow a concept to be a stable entity over time and different contexts. This justifies inter alia, that the concepts are shared and can be individuated as the same in the minds of different people at different times and cultures.
2. semantic individuation conditions allow individuals to those properties under a concept which expresses a content. The concept DOG expressed, or is content, ownership dog, if you do not, our thoughts that have as one of its parts the concept DOG, for example, the belief expressed by the sentence 'The pet dogs are faithful' - would be about anything. Conditions semantic individuation should additionally allow to account for the robust nature of the content-ie, that the content of a concept remains essentially the same despite any changes in its etiology. In this sense, the arguments given to support this kind of individuation should avoid include determining contingent epistemic devices.
3. possession conditions of a concept should identify those properties that are distinctive property of a mind to take one concept. Having a concept should be reduced to the ability to have thoughts about what the concept expresses. This ability depends on a mind has something to unequivocally is a concept and that concept has semantic properties allowing such thinking is about what the concept means. In other words, this condition presupposes that conditions of type (1) and (2) can be set and met. This seems to be more or less obvious: have a concept presupposes that some things are concepts that have properties that are constitutive of their identity and their content. The terms of office should add something to specify (1) and (2). But this, for reasons I shall at another time, it is questionable whether what is intended is to ontology concepts and not a psychological theory.