Jennna Jameson Blgospot

ARE THE CONDITIONS OF POSSESSION OF A CONCEPT INEVITABLY EPISTEMIC?

Guido Vallejos

Center for Cognitive Studies Department of Philosophy

Faculty of Philosophy and Humanities
Universidad de Chile

this work is to focus possession conditions of the concept. The formulation of such conditions is part of what is philosophically desirable contained in an answer to the question: What are the concepts? Will attempt to show that the problem of the nature of concepts is 1) an ontological problem, 2) a complex problem, ie, comprises more than one component, and 3) that the wording of the conditions of possession of a concept is part of the problem of the nature of his nature that should at least be consistent with the rest conditions.

informational atomism of Fodor (1998) is a theory that gives coherent response at least 1) and 2), but when trying to leave out one of the most unpleasant consequences, the radical nativism, shows that conditions require possession epistemic mechanism. This holding introduces conditions that violate 1). Therefore, they should be raised, or that the possession conditions are inevitably epistemic, or that is necessary to reformulate a new solution to the problem of radical nativism.

To begin, we must highlight the complex nature of the problem of the nature of concepts, based on adequacy requirements 1), 2) and 3). Briefly, it can be said for 1), it seems natural to address the problem of the nature of the concepts from an ontological perspective. Such a view seeks to find those factors that are constitutive and, therefore, metaphysically necessary concepts. Consequently, to show those aspects does not require appeal to epistemological factors, since they depend on a variety of mechanisms access to and use of the concepts and content, given their diversity and variability, are contingent and therefore not constitutive of concepts. This may seem obvious to the conditions of individuation of concepts, it has not been to many of the current approaches, both empirical and philosophical concepts, "since that time to address the conditions of individuation are determined by a conception semantics and the use of concepts, taking into account for this epistemic factors. Indeed, having a concept is to have its meaning and learn to use it, so it seems more or less obvious that the formulation of these conditions requires a capacity to appeal epistemic. However, epistemic capacities or mechanisms alone to be variable and contingent, could not form the basis for formulating constitutive conditions of concepts. For

2), one might say that the problem of the nature of the concepts requires the development of at least three conditions Terms of individuation of a concept, ie answer the question: what is a concept? Ii) Terms of individuation of the semantic properties of a concept, ie answer the question what properties make a concept expresses something or have a meaning?, and iii) Terms of possessing a concept, ie an answer to the question: what is to have a concept?

Finally, according to 3) an adequate philosophical conception of the nature of the concepts should provide a coherent response to the three questions above, or at least one of which can be removed from a concept that encompasses i), ii ) and iii) on terms consistent. I use the term 'coherence' to account for the requirement that all the conditions belonging to the same level of approximation, in this case, ontological.

An empirical theory of concepts in cognitive science, or assumed, either explicitly its response to these three questions. Such responses constitute, so to speak, the ontological which is explicit or presupposed in the theory.

Traditional approaches are based philosophy in the order set out above - i), ii) and iii) - although it is true that in most cases, a comprehensive formulation i) could give a coherent account of ii) and iii). More contemporaneously, the trend is starting, or of ii) or from iii) and assume that this would necessarily lead to a conception of i). As will be seen, the order of the answers is not indifferent. There is, as expressed by Fodor (1998), a metaphysical subtext, not properly justified, that determines how to rank the problem of the nature of concepts.

Indeed, usually contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists give preference to one of these types of conditions [[1]], so that, as stated in 3), other conditions can be detached from what is formulated in the first instance.

However, perhaps due to the fruitful discussions that have arisen from experimental research tradition initiated by Rosch (1978, in Margolis and Laurence, 1999), the trend in thinking about the nature of concepts is not to accommodate ontological consideration. Or, base ontological claims in epistemic premises. In other words, it tries to ground considerations about how things are in assumptions about how we, if we can, knowing these things, or how reliable epistemic capacities or mechanisms depends on your knowledge.

There are many reasons, among philosophers and cognitive scientists who contributed to this way of looking at the problem, the latter sometimes influenced by the first, but it is important to review them here. However, the antecedent of the ontological analysis presented here is worth thinking appropriate Kripke semantics and the draft Putnam (1975). Although might say, as some actually argue that the conditions of ownership, applicable to natural kind terms, not concepts, are formulated in epistemic-descriptive terms, the baptismal ceremony Kripke (1972) which gives rise to causal conception of meaning, and the dependence of the ground the meaning of such terms in respect of acts epistemic experts in Putnam.

However, such tests not only demonstrate the relevance of ontological point of view, at least in the identification of semantic properties, but also, and paradoxically, exhibit the defect of appeal ultimately to some kind of device epistemic to account for the conditions of possession. The central question for the purposes of this discussion is what may be revealed as the nature of things, including concepts, if not considered a metaphysical and ontological reflection that regulates the possibility and necessity of the conditions constituting the abstract properties that theories in cognitive science get in the causal relationships that underlie its generalizations?

then try to show that the rankings contemporary conditions whose satisfaction would realize the nature of concepts, and that orders are alternative assumptions leave without clarifying or justifying metaphysical. I shall follow the classical order, from i) to iii), in each case by showing how some contemporary theories, philosophical or from cognitive science, introduce unspecified metaphysical assumptions, which are not properly justified. These problems could be visualized by designing a kind of map or guide of the procedures that are assumed to develop simultaneously three types of conditions, - i), ii) and iii) - and noted in the description of this map how, at various positions characterized in this geography, fall into serious difficulties in prioritizing or an epistemic conception the semantic or epistemic conception of the conditions of possession.

This map should start setting up the avenues available for the formulation of the conditions of individuation. Through this advance would be possible to visualize the paths lead nowhere. These roads take on such a character as priority semantic individuation conditions and terms of possession by the conditions of individuation of concepts, from epistemic premises. A critical consideration of the classical view of concepts [[2]], theories of prototypes and samples [[3]], and the theory-theory [[4]] would conclude that the conditions of individuation can be formulated in non-epistemic terms, it is unnecessary to appeal to a semantic and condition of possession of epistemological. This would provide an argument for the plausibility of the Informational Atomism (AI). In what follows, we shall discuss briefly the proposed pathways for semantic individuation conditions and possession, ii) and iii).

Regarding the former, the analysis could follow a path similar to the conditions of individuation of a concept, concluding that the AI \u200b\u200bmanages to formulate conditions of individuation of semantic properties, separating epistemic determinations from some version of conceptual role semantics. In relation to the conditions of possession is possible to oppose the proposal more complete nature of the concepts, determined by the condition of possessing Peacocke (1992), with the AI. From this analysis it can be concluded that the AI \u200b\u200bdoes not maintain the purity Fodor ontological analysis, in terms of possession conditions. Fodor

To possess a concept is to have thoughts about the property that it expresses. According to this epistemic mechanisms serve no essential role in the formulation of these conditions of possession. However, to avoid radical nativism objection introduces epistemic device under which you can anchor (locking) between the concept and property, as stated by the informational semantics. In the case of artifact concepts - LATCH, SEAT, etc. mediator .-- device is innate sensorium, and in the case of natural kind concepts are devices management theories of cognitive resources to build experimental environments . In the first case, the mechanism is not cognitive, avoiding a circular approach, the second, the scientists in their attempt to capture the essential properties referred to by its concepts, transcending sensory appearances, resort to the establishment of experimental environments in order to induce others to the belief that a particular law is the case.

Building upon considerations of Recanati (2002), postulated that the AI \u200b\u200bof Fodor is articulated on the basis of an ontological constraint. To put this in negative terms, states that we must set aside any epistemic determination not only to formulate the conditions of possession, but also the other two conditions involved in the treatment of the nature of concepts. The problem that arises is to what extent this constraint is satisfied by the terms of possession in the AI. If the constraint is not respected, then or conditions are inevitably epistemic possession, in which case the margins are outside of the ontology, as apparently happens in Putnam, or have to rethink the wording of the conditions of ownership, avoiding dependence on intermediaries locking device, and in this case can be dispensed with the terms of office in an ontology of concepts. It is necessary to evaluate the possibility that the AI \u200b\u200bhas to leave the horns of the dilemma that I have made. REFERENCES




Carey, S. 1991/1999. Knowledge Acquisition: Enrichment or conceptual change?. In S. Carey and R.
Gelman (eds.). The epigenesis of mind. Hillsdale, NJ: Laurence Erlbaum. Reprinted in Margolis and Laurence 1999.

Fodor, JA 1998. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong . Oxford: Oxford University Press. (There is a English translation in Gedisa)

Fodor, JA, M. Garrett, E. Walker and C. Parkes.1980/1999. Against definitions. Cognition, 8. A shorter version in Margolis and Laurence 1999.

Kripke, S. 1972. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (No translation into English UNAM)

Lamberts, K. and D. Shanks (eds) 1997. Knowledge, Concepts, and categories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Margolis, E. and S. Laurence (eds.). 1999. Concepts: Core Readings. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Murphy, G. 2002. The big book of concepts . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Murphy, G.L. y D. Medin. 1985. The role of theories in conceptual coherence. Psychological Review 92. También en Margolis y Laurence 1999

Putnam, H., 1975. The meaning of ‘meaning’. En: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Languaje, Mind and Knowledge , Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, VII, University of Minnesota Press.

Recanati, F. 2002. The Fodorian Fallacy. Analysis 62(4)

Rosch, E. 1978 [1999]. Principles of categorization. En Margolis and Laurence (eds.) 1999.

Smith, E. and D. Medin. 1981. Categories and concepts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

[1] See Murphy, 2002, the five original articles in the compilation of Lamberts and Shanks, 1997, and Chapter 1 of Laurence and Margolis, 1999.
[2] See Murphy, 2002, Smith and Medin, 1981, Laurence and Margolis, 1999 and Fodor et al., 1980/1999.
[3] Murphy, 2002, Smith and Medin, 1981; Lamberts and Shanks, 1997
[4] Murphy, 2002, Murphy and Medin, 1985/1999, 1991/1999 Carey

Encouraging Scripture For The Dying

elucidated and nonsense in the Tractatus of Wittgenstein. Part 1

Guido Vallejos

Center for Cognitive Studies Department

Philosophy Faculty of Philosophy and Humanities

Universidad de Chile

A difficulty that often found the reader or commentator Tractatus is that it is based on a paradox. Almost the entire book is a series of observations about the nature of the world, thought, language and constitutive properties of logic. These observations show that the shape logic is the common essence and also the limit of thought, language and the world. However, a speech that is about the logical form is, for Wittgenstein, nonsense, and you can not represent what is the condition of possibility of representation as much as represented.

to Wittgenstein's philosophy makes no theories or abstract descriptions of the world, but language is critical. Criticism has no facts or propositions that involve states of affairs that exist in the world. Elucidations philosophy is trying to present clearly the limits of what can be said showing at the same time, the unspeakable. The presentation of the boundaries is sufficient to show those who try to hold a philosophical argument beyond what can be said and that, therefore, are uttering nonsense. The elucidations are not normative. He who has the vision to the limits by the elucidations, ipso facto know that any attempt to transcend them is to fall into the nonsense.

However, since the essential property of language is its ability to represent the facts of the world with which it shares its logical form, the elucidations would to be nonsense. Apart from not having a representational character, are about the properties that enable the language represents the world. For Wittgenstein language could not represent what is the condition for its representational capacity. If I could do, would be beyond the limit of what can be said.

Proposition 6.54 of the Tractatus reveals the paradoxical character that ultimately assume the elucidations that comprise the book. Enable it to meet the critical anchor role of language, but his character assumes characteristics elucidatorio semantic paradoxical. On the one hand, and to the extent they go beyond the limits of language, say nothing because they are nonsense, but on the other, show the limits of what can be said with respect, thereby serving to brake drives much of the philosophers to transcend the limits of language.

These two dimensions of the first critique of Wittgenstein's language are clearly paradoxical. The reader may well take the notion literally nonsense and elucidations of the Tractatus would be incoherent sounds and spellings - is gibberish the English term used by Diamond 1991. ¹ If so, it would be difficult for us to regard the Tractatus as one of the great works of history of philosophy. Given this extreme option, the reader could follow that Wittgenstein requires the reading of his text, and consider, near the end of Tractatus, which was necessary to understand the elucidations, because otherwise I could not have notion of the limits of language and therefore could not have realized that the elucidations were nonsense. But this option more restrained, if compared to the first, they lead to a series of problems perhaps worse than those that took us the radical nature of the first. We should distinguish between literal nonsense, or, if you want, radical - no nonsense literal or weak. Regarding the latter would have to provide some justification for why, despite being nonsense, is expected to cause the reader to understand certain fundamental metaphysical truths about the nature of language, its relationship with the world and its meaning. However, paradoxically from expressions that are, according to Wittgenstein himself. literal nonsense can determine a mechanism such significance that puts the reader's understanding of important metaphysical truths.

In what follows I will try to establish whether or not it is possible to describe the mechanism. Will start the presentation with a brief presentation of the metaphysical world of thought and language in the Tractatus this conception and contrast it with what Wittgenstein expressed in the proposition 6.54. From this review will show clearly the paradoxical character finally assumed by the philosophy of the Tractatus . On the basis of the above, examine the idea that John Wisdom function is that in his opinion meet philosophical discourse, as opposed to mathematical proofs and scientific discourse in general. Try to determine if the conception of Wisdom can at least serve as a starting point to describe how the Tractatus dicurso of , despite being a nonsense, can somehow communicate important metaphysical content. To Wisdom the philosophical discourse and that of psychoanalysis - 'almost came to try something' and therefore constitutes a paradox. On this basis it could be argued, at least in principle, that the speech tractates share this character would be paradoxical, since an attempt to show the world the constitutive properties of thought and speech without saying anything about them. However, be raising that if Wisdom characteristics attributed to what he calls the paradoxical discourse of philosophy and psychoanalysis are applied to the Tractatus , the force of metaphysical truths that supposedly weaken the book convey.

1. Wittgenstein can be said that the essential property of language is to represent the facts of the world through thought. The language expresses thoughts that are logical figures of the facts. Thoughts are intentional to the extent that elements of the figure actually touch the objects. The relationship between the elements of the figure and objects enables a projection method that allows the figure shows its meaning. The sense that the figure shows is that the objects are structured in fact a certain way. To this figure must have the same structure as the fact that figure. area is identified in the first place, Wittgenstein goes on to show that the traditional problems of philosophy beyond the limits of first areas to show that this paradox acquires its real significance taking into account that Wittgenstein's philosophical purposes are channeled through elucidations. Propositions are not properly so, why are meaningless, though, as Wittgenstein said in the proposition 6.54, who understands can transcend and be fair view of the world and that which transcends the limits of it.

By elucidations Wittgenstein the limits of language drawn from the analysis of language itself. All that is on the other side of the boundary corresponds to what can not be said and is therefore meaningless. What language is essentially characterized by logical form. But she will say Wittgenstein, can not speak, it should be placed outside of logic and therefore the language. (This will be discussed in depth later, but for now interested in highlighting these elements to make a clear characterization of the so-called paradox of silence.) The attempt to establish the limits of language inevitably leads to talk of logical form, which inevitably fall into the nonsense, because it says it can not be said. However, Wittgenstein is aware of the paradox, as one of the last propositions of the book says:

The true method of philosophy would really be: to say nothing, but what can be said, ie propositions of natural science [...] This method would leave unhappy others-it would not have the feeling that we were teaching philosophy, but it would be the only strictly correct. (TLP, 6.53)

Nearly complete delineation of the boundaries, which has been proposed in the Preface, the author shows that all their talk is a great nonsense, he has transgressed the limits of language, has talked about what we can not talk and, consequently, has not said anything. However, the reader realizes only the speech of the Tractatus no sense when through it you can access a different level, beyond language, and have "just world view" (TLP, 6.54). However, it is paradoxical to think that the Wittgensteinian philosophical discourse, which ultimately turns out to be a great absurdity, has previously had to the reader-that is, when it still lacks the vision of the world just some sense.

The obvious reaction against the situation described is to think that the entire speech is meaningless and that nothing has been said. However, it can be argued, from the perspective of Wittgenstein, that while nothing has been said, have shown the limits of language and hence what is beyond the limit. This counterargument, however, does not take into account what Wittgenstein himself says in 6.54:

elucidations My proposals are as follows: who understands me finally recognizes as nonsense, when by them-a shoulder-to made them pull himself above them. (He must so to speak, throw away the ladder once it has been perched on it.)

According to Wittgenstein expressed this observation who understands their purposes despite the fact that finally recognizes that his elucidations are nonsense can transcend and be the correct view of things. Indeed, to assert that their proposals are nonsense and at the same time cause some sort of philosophical understanding in the reader has at least aired a paradox. In this regard, Russell says in his Introduction to the Tractatus :

[...] After all, Wittgenstein finds a way to tell a good deal about that of which nothing can be said skeptical readers suggesting the possible existence of an exit.

In defense of Wittgenstein would say that to the extent that their elucidations not state facts. Therefore can not be evaluated as true or false. If what is said is meaningful only restricted to the scope of the proposals and if the elucidations, contrary to propositions are neither true nor false, then they are meaningless. Nevertheless, they show the reader the limits of what can be said with respect. And with that as it is beyond the limits. By showing what is beyond the limits of the world, thinkable and speakable, Wittgenstein shows the reader the area in which, in its conception, lies the thought, speech and topics of philosophy, saying nothing about it.

" [...] I have hit in my book to put everything back together firmly, keeping silent about it. (Quoted in Janik and Toulmin 1974: 243)

At this point another aspect acquires full significance of what I earlier called the paradox of silence. The author has not said anything about what is philosophically relevant. Has been silent on this and has managed to put "everything in place in a firm." This silence is very peculiar because it has been achieved through language; but in a language-that of the elucidations-meaningless that says nothing. As much as you try to break the paradox attempts are impossible, since one can not, strictly speaking, to communicate something to keep silent about it. Accordingly, the expression silence should not be understood literally here, because in fact there is silence for communicating, showing, what it is trying to communicate. Rather, it could be said to be silent about it does not communicate directly, but indirectly. Following this line of thought, the discourse of Tractatus, as well as talk about what you can not talk, is not intended to communicate what their proposals would mean (if anything mean), but point to something else that transcends, are merely a half to achieve a vision that is inherent not as significant.

Considering what I have said may be better understood the proposition 6.54. Wittgenstein assumes that the reader who is closely following the Tractarian philosophical discourse, come at a time to have "just world view" which, in turn, will take you to realize that the entire speech that served as support (or stairs) to access such a view is totally sense from the moment you have noticed that it has fulfilled its role of media.

might object, as stated at the beginning of this section, the speech and meaningless from the moment that is about what is beyond the limits of the world, thought and language and that, therefore, could hardly fulfill its role of media. What we have to respond, following Wittgenstein's analogy of the ladder, no matter the material it is constructed, provided it meets elucidatoria function.

regard to the character Paradoxically assumes Tractatus, and general philosophical discourse, the British philosopher John Wisdom believes that the use of paradoxes reflection takes unusual paths showing what keeping the traditional ways of thinking, would not have seen or would have been too boring. Wisdom About It says:

[...] Sometimes the reflection is still far from boring, it does not follow conventional lines, but presents the familiar things connected in ways that previously there had connected. So are new words and metaphors and paradoxes and contraparadojas what we need. A philosopher in the absence of new information and unable to entertain and amaze the way that a mathematician can do no other choice than to be paradoxical or boring. Metaphysical philosophers are no exception. Fortunately they are often paradoxical. (Wisdom).

According to the statement made by Wisdom in this passage, although one can explain the peculiar use of language is done in that situation, always under the impression that what was meant is and is not appropriate. In this regard, Wisdom said that the effect of the paradoxical nature of the discourse of the philosopher metaphysical is similar to having the interpretations of the conduct of psychoanalytic roots. In these cases one gets the impression that there are arguments in favor of such interpretations and reasons against it. This causes it impossible to design a comprehensive test of these interpretations. Wisdom says about it:

Imagine a marriage back home after having attended an introductory lecture on psychoanalysis. Van walked in silence until suddenly the husband said: What a mixture! And they call that science! ... The woman replies, 'Well, I think that almost came to test their central claims. " Arrive almost a try! " "Satirizes the husband, 'I've heard of the mathematical proof and scientific proof, but never reach almost to prove something." We assume that this response has succeeded in silencing his wife, but does it necessarily so? In no way, it is not something to which she referred to by the term 'nearly to try something "precisely the type of evidence appropriate to the paradox? (Wisdom 1964: 267)

considerations Bringing Wisdom to the paradox of disurso Tractatus, one can say that in a sense Wittgenstein has put everything firmly in place to keep silent about it, but in another sense it has not done. At the conclusion of his speech is nonsense, apparently has not said anything, but to achieve its purpose deictic had to use language, but beyond the limits of consciousness. The paradox remains: if the Tractatus consists mainly of nonsense, how the reader, apart from recognizing them as such, he realized that Wittgenstein was trying to show the world the limits of the speakable and thinkable and what lay beyond those limits. In other words, it seems reasonable, on the one hand, accepting that what the Tractatus expressed are nonsense; but then, those who understand Wittgenstein came to have an idea of \u200b\u200bthe limits and what was beyond them. How is it possible to understand the latter, if we accept at the same time that the elucidations of Tractatus are nonsense?

1 here I make this appeal only, for purposes of clarification, the term used by Cora Diamond to characterize the nonsense. Despite its austere and resolute reading of the Tractatus considers the elucidations as gibberish , description Initial gross extreme of nonsense I have just try to put the initial basis for formulating the problem that attempt to treat and not related in any way with what it actually proposes.

Female Masterbation Idea

elucidated and nonsense in the Tractatus of Wittgenstein. Part 1

A difficulty that often found the reader or commentator Tractatus is that it is based on a paradox. Almost the entire book is a series of observations about the nature of the world, thought, language and constitutive properties of logic. These observations show that the logical form is the common essence and also the limit of thought, language and the world. However, a speech that is about the logical form is, for Wittgenstein, nonsense, and you can not represent what is the condition of possibility of representation as much as represented.

to Wittgenstein's philosophy makes no theories or abstract descriptions of the world, but language is critical. The criticism does not consist of propositions that involve events or states of affairs that exist in the world. Elucidations philosophy is trying to present clearly the limits of what can be said, putting clear, while the unspeakable. The presentation of the boundaries is sufficient to show those who try to sustain a thesis fil osófica beyond what can be said and that, therefore, are uttering nonsense. The elucidations are not normative. He who has the vision to the limits by the elucidations, knows ipso facto that any attempt to transcend them is to fall into the nonsense.

However, since the essential property of language is its ability to represent the facts of the world who share their logical form, the elucidations would be nonsense. Apart from not having a representational character, are about the properties that enable the language represents the world. For Wittgenstein language could not represent what is the condition for its representational capacity. If I could do, would be beyond the limit of what can be said.

Proposition 6.54 of the Tractatus reveals the paradoxical character that ultimately assume the elucidations that comprise the book. They perform the function anchor of the critique of language, but his character assumes elucidatorio paradoxical semantic features. On the one hand, and to the extent they go beyond the limits of language, say nothing because they are nonsense, but on the other, show the limits of what can be said with respect, serving thus a check on the impulses of most philosophers to transcend the limits of language.

These two dimensions of the first critique of Wittgenstein's language are clearly paradoxical. The reader may well take the notion of nonsense literally and elucidations of the Tractatus would be incoherent sounds and spellings - gibberish is the English term used by Diamond 1991. ¹ If so, it would be difficult for us to consider the Tractatus as one of the great works of history of philosophy. Given this extreme option, the reader could follow that Wittgenstein requires the reading of his text, and consider, near the end of the Tractatus , it was necessary understand the elucidations, because otherwise I could not have notion of the limits of language and therefore could not have realized that the elucidations were nonsense. But this option more restrained, when compared to the first, they lead to a series of problems perhaps worse than those that took us the radical nature of the first. We should distinguish between literal nonsense, or, if you want, radical - no nonsense literal or weak. Regarding the latter would have to provide some justification for why, despite being nonsense, is expected to cause the reader to understand certain metaphysical truths regarding the fundamental nature of language, its relationship with the world and its meaning. However, paradoxically from expressions that are, according to Wittgenstein himself. literal nonsense can be identified as a significant mechanism that puts the reader's understanding of important metaphysical truths.

In what follows I will try to establish whether or not it is possible to describe the mechanism. Will start the presentation with a brief presentation of the metaphysical world of thought and language in the Tractatus and contrast it this concept with what Wittgenstein expressed in the proposition 6.54. From this review will show clearly the paradoxical character finally assumed by the philosophy of the Tractatus . On the basis of the above, examine the idea that John Wisdom is the role that in its opinion meet the philosophical discourse, as opposed to mathematical proofs and scientific discourse in general. Try to determine if the conception of Wisdom can at least serve as a starting point to describe how the dicurso the Tractatus , despite being a nonsense, can somehow communicate important metaphysical content. To Wisdom the philosophical discourse and that of psychoanalysis - 'almost came to try something' and therefore constitutes a paradox. On this basis it could be argued, at least in principle, that the speech tractates share this paradoxical character as it would be an attempt to show the world the constitutive properties of thought and speech without saying anything about them. However, be raising that if Wisdom characteristics attributed to what he calls the paradoxical discourse of philosophy and psychoanalysis are applied to the Tractatus , the force of metaphysical truths that supposedly weaken the book convey.

1. You can say that for Wittgenstein l to essential property of language is to represent the facts of the world through thought. The language expresses thoughts that are logical pictures of facts. Thoughts are intentional to the extent that elements of the figure actually touch the objects. The relationship between the elements of the figure and objects enables a projection method that allows the figure shows its meaning. The meaning is that the figure shows objects are structured in fact a certain way. To this figure must have the same structure as the fact that figure. area is identified in the first place, Wittgenstein goes on to show that the traditional problems of philosophy beyond the limits of first areas to show that this paradox acquires its real significance taking into account that Wittgenstein's philosophical purposes are channeled through elucidations. Propositions are not properly so, why are meaningless, though, as Wittgenstein said in the proposition 6.54, who understands can transcend and be fair view of the world and that which transcends it limits.

By elucidations Wittgenstein the limits of language drawn from the analysis of language itself. All that is on the other side of the boundary corresponds to what can not be said and is therefore meaningless. What language is essentially characterized by logical form. But she will say Wittgenstein, can not speak as they would have located outside of logic and therefore the language. (This will be discussed in depth later, but for now interested in highlighting these elements to make a clear characterization of the so-called paradox of silence.) The attempt to establish the limits of language necessarily lead to talk of logical form, which inevitably falls into the nonsense, because it says it can not be said. However, Wittgenstein is aware of the paradox, as one of the last propositions of the book says:

The true method of philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what you can say it is ie propositions of natural science [...] This approach unhappy to leave because the others would not have the feeling that we were teaching philosophy, "but would only strictly correct. (TLP, 6.53)

Nearly complete delineation of the boundaries, which has been proposed in the Preface, the author shows that all their talk is a great nonsense, he has transgressed the limits of language, has talked about what we can not talk and, consequently, has not said anything. However, the reader only realizes that the discourse of Tractatus is meaningless when through it you can access a different level, beyond language, and have "just world view" (TLP, 6.54). However, it is paradoxical to think that Wittgensteinian philosophical discourse, which ultimately turns out to be a great absurdity, has previously had to the reader-that is, when it still lacks the vision of the world just some sense.

The obvious reaction against the situation described is to think that the entire speech is meaningless and that nothing has been said. However, it can be argued, from the perspective of Wittgenstein, that although nothing has been said, have shown the limits of language and hence what is beyond the limit. This counterargument, however, does not take into account what Wittgenstein himself says in 6.54:

elucidations My suggestions are this: who understands me finally recognizes as nonsense, when by them-on the shoulders of them managed to pull himself up-to above them. (He must so to speak, throw away the ladder once it has been perched on it.)

According to Wittgenstein expressed this observation who understands their goals regardless of who finally acknowledges that his elucidations are nonsense is able to transcend them and have the correct view of things. Indeed, to assert that their proposals are nonsense and at the same time cause any philosophical understanding in the reader has at least aired a paradox. In this regard, Russell says in his Introduction to Tractatus :

[...] After all, Wittgenstein finds a way to tell a good deal about that of which nothing can be said, suggesting the reader skeptical of the possible existence of an exit.

In defense of Wittgenstein would say that to the extent that their elucidations not state facts. Therefore can not be evaluated as true or false. If what is said to be meaningful only is restricted to the scope of the proposals and if the elucidations, contrary to propositions are neither true nor false, then they are meaningless. Nevertheless, they show the reader the limits of what can be said with respect. And with that as it is beyond the limits. By showing what is beyond the limits of the world, thinkable and speakable, Wittgenstein shows the reader the area in which, in its conception, lies the thought, speech and topics of philosophy, without saying nothing about it.

" [...] I have hit in my book to put everything in place a firmly, keeping silent about it. (Quoted in Janik and Toulmin 1974: 243)

At this point another aspect acquires full significance of what I earlier called the paradox of silence. The author has not said anything about what is philosophically relevant. Has been silent on this and has managed to put "everything in place in a firm." This silence is very peculiar because it has been accomplished through language, but language-that of the elucidations-meaningless that says nothing. However much you try to break the paradox attempts are impossible, since one can not, strictly speaking, communicating something to keep silent about it. Accordingly, the expression silence should not be understood literally here, because in fact there is silence for communicating, showing, what it is trying to communicate. Rather, it could be said to be silent about it does not communicate directly, but indirectly. Following this line of thought, the discourse of Tractatus, as well as talk about what you can not talk, is not intended to communicate what their proposals would mean (if anything mean), but aim to something else that transcends, are merely a half to achieve a vision that is inherent not as significant.

Considering what I have said may be better understood the proposition 6.54. Wittgenstein assumes that the reader who is closely following the Tractarian philosophical discourse, come at a time to have "just world view" which, in turn, will take you to realize that the entire speech that served as support (or stairs) to access such a view totally meaningless from the moment you have noticed that it has fulfilled its role of media.

One might object, as stated at the beginning of this section, the speech and meaningless from the moment that is about what is beyond the limits of the world, thought and language, and that therefore badly could fulfill its role of media. What we have to respond, following Wittgenstein's analogy of the ladder, no matter the material it is constructed, provided it meets elucidatoria function.

Regarding the paradoxical character who assumes the Tractatus , and general philosophical discourse, the British philosopher John Wisdom believes that the use of paradoxes reflection takes unusual paths showing what keeping the traditional ways of thinking, would not have seen or would have been too boring. Wisdom About It says:

[...] Sometimes the reflection is still far from boring, it does not follow conventional lines, but presents the familiar things connected in ways that previously there had connected. So are new words and metaphors and paradoxes and contraparadojas what we need. A philosopher in the absence of new information and unable to entertain and amaze us the way who can do a mathematician, he has no alternative but to be paradoxical or boring. Metaphysical philosophers are no exception. Fortunately they are often paradoxical. (Wisdom).

According to the statement made by Wisdom in this passage, although one can explain the peculiar use of language is done in that situation, always under the impression that what was meant is and is not appropriate. In this regard, Wisdom said that the effect of the paradoxical nature of the discourse of metaphysical philosopher is similar to what are the interpretations of the conduct of psychoanalytic roots. In these cases one gets the impression that there are reasons in favor of such interpretations and reasons against. This causes it impossible to design a comprehensive test of these interpretations. Wisdom says about it:

Imagine a couple returns home after having attended an introductory lecture on psychoanalysis. Van walked in silence until suddenly the husband said: What a mixture! And they call that science! ... The woman replies, 'Well, I think that almost came to test their central claims. " Reaching almost to try! " "Satirizes the husband, 'I've heard of the mathematical proof and scientific evidence, but never reach almost to prove something. " We assume that this response has succeeded in silencing his wife, but does it necessarily so? In no way, it is not something to which she referred to by the term 'nearly to try something "precisely the type of evidence appropriate to the paradox? (Wisdom 1964: 267)

considerations Bringing Wisdom to the paradox of disurso Tractatus, one can say that in a sense Wittgenstein has put everything firmly in place to keep quiet about it but in another sense not has done. At the conclusion of his speech is nonsense, apparently has not said anything, but to achieve its purpose deictic had to use language, but beyond the limits of consciousness. The paradox remains: if the Tractatus consists mainly of nonsense, how the reader, apart from recognizing them as such, he realized that Wittgenstein was trying to show the world the limits of the speakable and thinkable and what lay beyond those limits. In other words, it seems reasonable, on the one hand, accepting that what the Tractatus expressed are nonsense, but on the other hand, Wittgenstein came to understand to get an idea of \u200b\u200bthe limits and what was beyond them. How is it possible to understand the latter, if we accept at the same time that the elucidations of Tractatus are nonsense?

1 here I make this appeal only, for purposes of clarification, the term used by Cora Diamond to characterize the nonsense. Despite its austere and resolute reading of the Tractatus considers the elucidations as gibberish , the extreme initial coarse description I made of the nonsense just try to put the initial basis for formulating the problem that attempt to treat and not related in any way with what it actually proposes.