Invisiblefree.com Proxy

basis for an ontology of concepts

Guido Vallejos

Center for Cognitive Studies Department

Philosophy Faculty of Philosophy and Humanities

Universidad de Chile

An ontology of concepts is intended to make the conditions of individuation of the constitutive properties of the same. Constitutive properties means those that make a concept is what it is and nothing else. There are certain properties that intuitively ascribe to concepts of which those listed below seem to have a special relevance. First are mental entities of some kind, that have a crucial role in our thought processes, and second, they are mental things that make us think about the world and other things that are not concepts, and thirdly, that the fact concepts that have an impact on the role that concepts play in our cognitive processes and on the property that they have to be about something other than themselves. From these properties that intuitively ascribe these entities, the ontology should formulate the conditions which would result in satisfaction of such individuation properties. However, most fundamentally, it seems, is not formulated in precise terms those conditions, but to provide arguments that would found the possibility of developing these conditions. The arguments should show that these properties are actually constitutive of concepts, that meeting these conditions would result in clear individuation of those properties and that no other properties that could be regarded as constituting. An additional requirement is that an ontology of this type allows you to specify, at least in principle, the substantive assumptions of any theory supported by experimental evidence in cognitive science. This is not a requirement intrinsic to the ontology, but rather by the characteristics that currently the division of labor within cognitive science.

Consistent with the finding in the previous paragraph, we can say that the ontology of concepts is intended to make three types of conditions.

1. individuation conditions of a concept or, to avoid further confusion, the terms of identity. These should not only allow us to distinguish the concepts of other kinds of things in the world, but also distinguish two concepts are coreferential, ie, they express the same content-as in the case of water and H2O. concept. On the other hand, bases would be established based on what the more general domain ontology which includes concepts, the most common options are that concepts are entities that belong to the realm of mental and concepts belong to an extra domain -mental. Assuming that belong to the realm of the mind must be clear what is the subdomain of the mind which are metaphysically dependent. Finally, the ontology must account for the conditions that allow a concept to be a stable entity over time and different contexts. This justifies inter alia, that the concepts are shared and can be individuated as the same in the minds of different people at different times and cultures.
2. semantic individuation conditions allow individuals to those properties under a concept which expresses a content. The concept DOG expressed, or is content, ownership dog, if you do not, our thoughts that have as one of its parts the concept DOG, for example, the belief expressed by the sentence 'The pet dogs are faithful' - would be about anything. Conditions semantic individuation should additionally allow to account for the robust nature of the content-ie, that the content of a concept remains essentially the same despite any changes in its etiology. In this sense, the arguments given to support this kind of individuation should avoid include determining contingent epistemic devices.
3. possession conditions of a concept should identify those properties that are distinctive property of a mind to take one concept. Having a concept should be reduced to the ability to have thoughts about what the concept expresses. This ability depends on a mind has something to unequivocally is a concept and that concept has semantic properties allowing such thinking is about what the concept means. In other words, this condition presupposes that conditions of type (1) and (2) can be set and met. This seems to be more or less obvious: have a concept presupposes that some things are concepts that have properties that are constitutive of their identity and their content. The terms of office should add something to specify (1) and (2). But this, for reasons I shall at another time, it is questionable whether what is intended is to ontology concepts and not a psychological theory.