Guido Vallejos
Center for Cognitive Studies Department of Philosophy Faculty of Philosophy and Humanities
Universidad de Chile
this work is to focus possession conditions of the concept. The formulation of such conditions is part of what is philosophically desirable contained in an answer to the question: What are the concepts? Will attempt to show that the problem of the nature of concepts is 1) an ontological problem, 2) a complex problem, ie, comprises more than one component, and 3) that the wording of the conditions of possession of a concept is part of the problem of the nature of his nature that should at least be consistent with the rest conditions.
informational atomism of Fodor (1998) is a theory that gives coherent response at least 1) and 2), but when trying to leave out one of the most unpleasant consequences, the radical nativism, shows that conditions require possession epistemic mechanism. This holding introduces conditions that violate 1). Therefore, they should be raised, or that the possession conditions are inevitably epistemic, or that is necessary to reformulate a new solution to the problem of radical nativism.
To begin, we must highlight the complex nature of the problem of the nature of concepts, based on adequacy requirements 1), 2) and 3). Briefly, it can be said for 1), it seems natural to address the problem of the nature of the concepts from an ontological perspective. Such a view seeks to find those factors that are constitutive and, therefore, metaphysically necessary concepts. Consequently, to show those aspects does not require appeal to epistemological factors, since they depend on a variety of mechanisms access to and use of the concepts and content, given their diversity and variability, are contingent and therefore not constitutive of concepts. This may seem obvious to the conditions of individuation of concepts, it has not been to many of the current approaches, both empirical and philosophical concepts, "since that time to address the conditions of individuation are determined by a conception semantics and the use of concepts, taking into account for this epistemic factors. Indeed, having a concept is to have its meaning and learn to use it, so it seems more or less obvious that the formulation of these conditions requires a capacity to appeal epistemic. However, epistemic capacities or mechanisms alone to be variable and contingent, could not form the basis for formulating constitutive conditions of concepts. For
2), one might say that the problem of the nature of the concepts requires the development of at least three conditions Terms of individuation of a concept, ie answer the question: what is a concept? Ii) Terms of individuation of the semantic properties of a concept, ie answer the question what properties make a concept expresses something or have a meaning?, and iii) Terms of possessing a concept, ie an answer to the question: what is to have a concept?
Finally, according to 3) an adequate philosophical conception of the nature of the concepts should provide a coherent response to the three questions above, or at least one of which can be removed from a concept that encompasses i), ii ) and iii) on terms consistent. I use the term 'coherence' to account for the requirement that all the conditions belonging to the same level of approximation, in this case, ontological.
An empirical theory of concepts in cognitive science, or assumed, either explicitly its response to these three questions. Such responses constitute, so to speak, the ontological which is explicit or presupposed in the theory.
Traditional approaches are based philosophy in the order set out above - i), ii) and iii) - although it is true that in most cases, a comprehensive formulation i) could give a coherent account of ii) and iii). More contemporaneously, the trend is starting, or of ii) or from iii) and assume that this would necessarily lead to a conception of i). As will be seen, the order of the answers is not indifferent. There is, as expressed by Fodor (1998), a metaphysical subtext, not properly justified, that determines how to rank the problem of the nature of concepts.
Indeed, usually contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists give preference to one of these types of conditions [[1]], so that, as stated in 3), other conditions can be detached from what is formulated in the first instance.
However, perhaps due to the fruitful discussions that have arisen from experimental research tradition initiated by Rosch (1978, in Margolis and Laurence, 1999), the trend in thinking about the nature of concepts is not to accommodate ontological consideration. Or, base ontological claims in epistemic premises. In other words, it tries to ground considerations about how things are in assumptions about how we, if we can, knowing these things, or how reliable epistemic capacities or mechanisms depends on your knowledge.
There are many reasons, among philosophers and cognitive scientists who contributed to this way of looking at the problem, the latter sometimes influenced by the first, but it is important to review them here. However, the antecedent of the ontological analysis presented here is worth thinking appropriate Kripke semantics and the draft Putnam (1975). Although might say, as some actually argue that the conditions of ownership, applicable to natural kind terms, not concepts, are formulated in epistemic-descriptive terms, the baptismal ceremony Kripke (1972) which gives rise to causal conception of meaning, and the dependence of the ground the meaning of such terms in respect of acts epistemic experts in Putnam.
However, such tests not only demonstrate the relevance of ontological point of view, at least in the identification of semantic properties, but also, and paradoxically, exhibit the defect of appeal ultimately to some kind of device epistemic to account for the conditions of possession. The central question for the purposes of this discussion is what may be revealed as the nature of things, including concepts, if not considered a metaphysical and ontological reflection that regulates the possibility and necessity of the conditions constituting the abstract properties that theories in cognitive science get in the causal relationships that underlie its generalizations?
then try to show that the rankings contemporary conditions whose satisfaction would realize the nature of concepts, and that orders are alternative assumptions leave without clarifying or justifying metaphysical. I shall follow the classical order, from i) to iii), in each case by showing how some contemporary theories, philosophical or from cognitive science, introduce unspecified metaphysical assumptions, which are not properly justified. These problems could be visualized by designing a kind of map or guide of the procedures that are assumed to develop simultaneously three types of conditions, - i), ii) and iii) - and noted in the description of this map how, at various positions characterized in this geography, fall into serious difficulties in prioritizing or an epistemic conception the semantic or epistemic conception of the conditions of possession.
This map should start setting up the avenues available for the formulation of the conditions of individuation. Through this advance would be possible to visualize the paths lead nowhere. These roads take on such a character as priority semantic individuation conditions and terms of possession by the conditions of individuation of concepts, from epistemic premises. A critical consideration of the classical view of concepts [[2]], theories of prototypes and samples [[3]], and the theory-theory [[4]] would conclude that the conditions of individuation can be formulated in non-epistemic terms, it is unnecessary to appeal to a semantic and condition of possession of epistemological. This would provide an argument for the plausibility of the Informational Atomism (AI). In what follows, we shall discuss briefly the proposed pathways for semantic individuation conditions and possession, ii) and iii).
Regarding the former, the analysis could follow a path similar to the conditions of individuation of a concept, concluding that the AI \u200b\u200bmanages to formulate conditions of individuation of semantic properties, separating epistemic determinations from some version of conceptual role semantics. In relation to the conditions of possession is possible to oppose the proposal more complete nature of the concepts, determined by the condition of possessing Peacocke (1992), with the AI. From this analysis it can be concluded that the AI \u200b\u200bdoes not maintain the purity Fodor ontological analysis, in terms of possession conditions. Fodor
To possess a concept is to have thoughts about the property that it expresses. According to this epistemic mechanisms serve no essential role in the formulation of these conditions of possession. However, to avoid radical nativism objection introduces epistemic device under which you can anchor (locking) between the concept and property, as stated by the informational semantics. In the case of artifact concepts - LATCH, SEAT, etc. mediator .-- device is innate sensorium, and in the case of natural kind concepts are devices management theories of cognitive resources to build experimental environments . In the first case, the mechanism is not cognitive, avoiding a circular approach, the second, the scientists in their attempt to capture the essential properties referred to by its concepts, transcending sensory appearances, resort to the establishment of experimental environments in order to induce others to the belief that a particular law is the case.
Building upon considerations of Recanati (2002), postulated that the AI \u200b\u200bof Fodor is articulated on the basis of an ontological constraint. To put this in negative terms, states that we must set aside any epistemic determination not only to formulate the conditions of possession, but also the other two conditions involved in the treatment of the nature of concepts. The problem that arises is to what extent this constraint is satisfied by the terms of possession in the AI. If the constraint is not respected, then or conditions are inevitably epistemic possession, in which case the margins are outside of the ontology, as apparently happens in Putnam, or have to rethink the wording of the conditions of ownership, avoiding dependence on intermediaries locking device, and in this case can be dispensed with the terms of office in an ontology of concepts. It is necessary to evaluate the possibility that the AI \u200b\u200bhas to leave the horns of the dilemma that I have made. REFERENCES
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[2] See Murphy, 2002, Smith and Medin, 1981, Laurence and Margolis, 1999 and Fodor et al., 1980/1999.
[3] Murphy, 2002, Smith and Medin, 1981; Lamberts and Shanks, 1997
[4] Murphy, 2002, Murphy and Medin, 1985/1999, 1991/1999 Carey
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