A difficulty that often found the reader or commentator Tractatus is that it is based on a paradox. Almost the entire book is a series of observations about the nature of the world, thought, language and constitutive properties of logic. These observations show that the logical form is the common essence and also the limit of thought, language and the world. However, a speech that is about the logical form is, for Wittgenstein, nonsense, and you can not represent what is the condition of possibility of representation as much as represented.
to Wittgenstein's philosophy makes no theories or abstract descriptions of the world, but language is critical. The criticism does not consist of propositions that involve events or states of affairs that exist in the world. Elucidations philosophy is trying to present clearly the limits of what can be said, putting clear, while the unspeakable. The presentation of the boundaries is sufficient to show those who try to sustain a thesis fil osófica beyond what can be said and that, therefore, are uttering nonsense. The elucidations are not normative. He who has the vision to the limits by the elucidations, knows ipso facto that any attempt to transcend them is to fall into the nonsense.
However, since the essential property of language is its ability to represent the facts of the world who share their logical form, the elucidations would be nonsense. Apart from not having a representational character, are about the properties that enable the language represents the world. For Wittgenstein language could not represent what is the condition for its representational capacity. If I could do, would be beyond the limit of what can be said.
Proposition 6.54 of the Tractatus reveals the paradoxical character that ultimately assume the elucidations that comprise the book. They perform the function anchor of the critique of language, but his character assumes elucidatorio paradoxical semantic features. On the one hand, and to the extent they go beyond the limits of language, say nothing because they are nonsense, but on the other, show the limits of what can be said with respect, serving thus a check on the impulses of most philosophers to transcend the limits of language.
These two dimensions of the first critique of Wittgenstein's language are clearly paradoxical. The reader may well take the notion of nonsense literally and elucidations of the Tractatus would be incoherent sounds and spellings - gibberish is the English term used by Diamond 1991. 1 If so, it would be difficult for us to consider the Tractatus as one of the great works of history of philosophy. Given this extreme option, the reader could follow that Wittgenstein requires the reading of his text, and consider, near the end of the Tractatus , it was necessary understand the elucidations, because otherwise I could not have notion of the limits of language and therefore could not have realized that the elucidations were nonsense. But this option more restrained, when compared to the first, they lead to a series of problems perhaps worse than those that took us the radical nature of the first. We should distinguish between literal nonsense, or, if you want, radical - no nonsense literal or weak. Regarding the latter would have to provide some justification for why, despite being nonsense, is expected to cause the reader to understand certain metaphysical truths regarding the fundamental nature of language, its relationship with the world and its meaning. However, paradoxically from expressions that are, according to Wittgenstein himself. literal nonsense can be identified as a significant mechanism that puts the reader's understanding of important metaphysical truths.
In what follows I will try to establish whether or not it is possible to describe the mechanism. Will start the presentation with a brief presentation of the metaphysical world of thought and language in the Tractatus and contrast it this concept with what Wittgenstein expressed in the proposition 6.54. From this review will show clearly the paradoxical character finally assumed by the philosophy of the Tractatus . On the basis of the above, examine the idea that John Wisdom is the role that in its opinion meet the philosophical discourse, as opposed to mathematical proofs and scientific discourse in general. Try to determine if the conception of Wisdom can at least serve as a starting point to describe how the dicurso the Tractatus , despite being a nonsense, can somehow communicate important metaphysical content. To Wisdom the philosophical discourse and that of psychoanalysis - 'almost came to try something' and therefore constitutes a paradox. On this basis it could be argued, at least in principle, that the speech tractates share this paradoxical character as it would be an attempt to show the world the constitutive properties of thought and speech without saying anything about them. However, be raising that if Wisdom characteristics attributed to what he calls the paradoxical discourse of philosophy and psychoanalysis are applied to the Tractatus , the force of metaphysical truths that supposedly weaken the book convey.
1. You can say that for Wittgenstein l to essential property of language is to represent the facts of the world through thought. The language expresses thoughts that are logical pictures of facts. Thoughts are intentional to the extent that elements of the figure actually touch the objects. The relationship between the elements of the figure and objects enables a projection method that allows the figure shows its meaning. The meaning is that the figure shows objects are structured in fact a certain way. To this figure must have the same structure as the fact that figure. area is identified in the first place, Wittgenstein goes on to show that the traditional problems of philosophy beyond the limits of first areas to show that this paradox acquires its real significance taking into account that Wittgenstein's philosophical purposes are channeled through elucidations. Propositions are not properly so, why are meaningless, though, as Wittgenstein said in the proposition 6.54, who understands can transcend and be fair view of the world and that which transcends it limits.
By elucidations Wittgenstein the limits of language drawn from the analysis of language itself. All that is on the other side of the boundary corresponds to what can not be said and is therefore meaningless. What language is essentially characterized by logical form. But she will say Wittgenstein, can not speak as they would have located outside of logic and therefore the language. (This will be discussed in depth later, but for now interested in highlighting these elements to make a clear characterization of the so-called paradox of silence.) The attempt to establish the limits of language necessarily lead to talk of logical form, which inevitably falls into the nonsense, because it says it can not be said. However, Wittgenstein is aware of the paradox, as one of the last propositions of the book says:
The true method of philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what you can say it is ie propositions of natural science [...] This approach unhappy to leave because the others would not have the feeling that we were teaching philosophy, "but would only strictly correct. (TLP, 6.53)
Nearly complete delineation of the boundaries, which has been proposed in the Preface, the author shows that all their talk is a great nonsense, he has transgressed the limits of language, has talked about what we can not talk and, consequently, has not said anything. However, the reader only realizes that the discourse of Tractatus is meaningless when through it you can access a different level, beyond language, and have "just world view" (TLP, 6.54). However, it is paradoxical to think that Wittgensteinian philosophical discourse, which ultimately turns out to be a great absurdity, has previously had to the reader-that is, when it still lacks the vision of the world just some sense.
The obvious reaction against the situation described is to think that the entire speech is meaningless and that nothing has been said. However, it can be argued, from the perspective of Wittgenstein, that although nothing has been said, have shown the limits of language and hence what is beyond the limit. This counterargument, however, does not take into account what Wittgenstein himself says in 6.54:
elucidations My suggestions are this: who understands me finally recognizes as nonsense, when by them-on the shoulders of them managed to pull himself up-to above them. (He must so to speak, throw away the ladder once it has been perched on it.)
According to Wittgenstein expressed this observation who understands their goals regardless of who finally acknowledges that his elucidations are nonsense is able to transcend them and have the correct view of things. Indeed, to assert that their proposals are nonsense and at the same time cause any philosophical understanding in the reader has at least aired a paradox. In this regard, Russell says in his Introduction to Tractatus :
[...] After all, Wittgenstein finds a way to tell a good deal about that of which nothing can be said, suggesting the reader skeptical of the possible existence of an exit.
In defense of Wittgenstein would say that to the extent that their elucidations not state facts. Therefore can not be evaluated as true or false. If what is said to be meaningful only is restricted to the scope of the proposals and if the elucidations, contrary to propositions are neither true nor false, then they are meaningless. Nevertheless, they show the reader the limits of what can be said with respect. And with that as it is beyond the limits. By showing what is beyond the limits of the world, thinkable and speakable, Wittgenstein shows the reader the area in which, in its conception, lies the thought, speech and topics of philosophy, without saying nothing about it.
" [...] I have hit in my book to put everything in place a firmly, keeping silent about it. (Quoted in Janik and Toulmin 1974: 243)
At this point another aspect acquires full significance of what I earlier called the paradox of silence. The author has not said anything about what is philosophically relevant. Has been silent on this and has managed to put "everything in place in a firm." This silence is very peculiar because it has been accomplished through language, but language-that of the elucidations-meaningless that says nothing. However much you try to break the paradox attempts are impossible, since one can not, strictly speaking, communicating something to keep silent about it. Accordingly, the expression silence should not be understood literally here, because in fact there is silence for communicating, showing, what it is trying to communicate. Rather, it could be said to be silent about it does not communicate directly, but indirectly. Following this line of thought, the discourse of Tractatus, as well as talk about what you can not talk, is not intended to communicate what their proposals would mean (if anything mean), but aim to something else that transcends, are merely a half to achieve a vision that is inherent not as significant.
Considering what I have said may be better understood the proposition 6.54. Wittgenstein assumes that the reader who is closely following the Tractarian philosophical discourse, come at a time to have "just world view" which, in turn, will take you to realize that the entire speech that served as support (or stairs) to access such a view totally meaningless from the moment you have noticed that it has fulfilled its role of media.
One might object, as stated at the beginning of this section, the speech and meaningless from the moment that is about what is beyond the limits of the world, thought and language, and that therefore badly could fulfill its role of media. What we have to respond, following Wittgenstein's analogy of the ladder, no matter the material it is constructed, provided it meets elucidatoria function.
Regarding the paradoxical character who assumes the Tractatus , and general philosophical discourse, the British philosopher John Wisdom believes that the use of paradoxes reflection takes unusual paths showing what keeping the traditional ways of thinking, would not have seen or would have been too boring. Wisdom About It says:
[...] Sometimes the reflection is still far from boring, it does not follow conventional lines, but presents the familiar things connected in ways that previously there had connected. So are new words and metaphors and paradoxes and contraparadojas what we need. A philosopher in the absence of new information and unable to entertain and amaze us the way who can do a mathematician, he has no alternative but to be paradoxical or boring. Metaphysical philosophers are no exception. Fortunately they are often paradoxical. (Wisdom).
According to the statement made by Wisdom in this passage, although one can explain the peculiar use of language is done in that situation, always under the impression that what was meant is and is not appropriate. In this regard, Wisdom said that the effect of the paradoxical nature of the discourse of metaphysical philosopher is similar to what are the interpretations of the conduct of psychoanalytic roots. In these cases one gets the impression that there are reasons in favor of such interpretations and reasons against. This causes it impossible to design a comprehensive test of these interpretations. Wisdom says about it:
Imagine a couple returns home after having attended an introductory lecture on psychoanalysis. Van walked in silence until suddenly the husband said: What a mixture! And they call that science! ... The woman replies, 'Well, I think that almost came to test their central claims. " Reaching almost to try! " "Satirizes the husband, 'I've heard of the mathematical proof and scientific evidence, but never reach almost to prove something. " We assume that this response has succeeded in silencing his wife, but does it necessarily so? In no way, it is not something to which she referred to by the term 'nearly to try something "precisely the type of evidence appropriate to the paradox? (Wisdom 1964: 267)
considerations Bringing Wisdom to the paradox of disurso Tractatus, one can say that in a sense Wittgenstein has put everything firmly in place to keep quiet about it but in another sense not has done. At the conclusion of his speech is nonsense, apparently has not said anything, but to achieve its purpose deictic had to use language, but beyond the limits of consciousness. The paradox remains: if the Tractatus consists mainly of nonsense, how the reader, apart from recognizing them as such, he realized that Wittgenstein was trying to show the world the limits of the speakable and thinkable and what lay beyond those limits. In other words, it seems reasonable, on the one hand, accepting that what the Tractatus expressed are nonsense, but on the other hand, Wittgenstein came to understand to get an idea of \u200b\u200bthe limits and what was beyond them. How is it possible to understand the latter, if we accept at the same time that the elucidations of Tractatus are nonsense?
1 here I make this appeal only, for purposes of clarification, the term used by Cora Diamond to characterize the nonsense. Despite its austere and resolute reading of the Tractatus considers the elucidations as gibberish , the extreme initial coarse description I made of the nonsense just try to put the initial basis for formulating the problem that attempt to treat and not related in any way with what it actually proposes.
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